Tag: Attack

In the backdrop of the Pathankot attack, it becomes important to think about Pakistan’s nuclear program because Pakistan’s nuclear bluff stops India from taking any concrete actions against it. Nukes have pretty little tactical benefit apart from killing civilians — which can also be contained once the nuclear threat is not a surprise. The pertinent question in the Indo-Pak equation is to find out how big Pakistan’s nuclear threat really is, or whether it is just a bluff under which the Pakistan military can avoid an overt Indian response.

In the first part of this article, we will summarize how the devastating effects of nuclear weapons are exaggerated in the regular media. In the second part, we will specifically talk about Pakistan’s nuclear program and show that Pakistan neither has the requisite delivery vehicles nor enough warheads to cause enough destruction to change the tide of a war.

The first and foremost important point to consider is that the nuclear bomb can neither deliver nor guarantee victory or stalemate in any war — and specifically in an Indo-Pak war. Just like in a battle not all fired bullets deliver the head of the enemy, similarly a nuclear strike will achieve very few of its intended target goals. One of the biggest misconceptions is related to the destructive power of modern bombs as compared to the smaller bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. William H. Hessler put this succinctly:

A more powerful bomb is now in production. It will release more energy and therefore work destruction over a larger area. But the area does not increase in proportion to the augmented power of the bomb. In military terms, which are not the same as scientific terms, the more powerful the bomb, the less efficient it is. For most military purposes ten bombs, each with one tenth of the power of the Nagasaki bomb, would be more effective than was the one Nagasaki bomb.

— William H. Hessler

So a more powerful bomb will be more destructive but destruction will not increase linearly. The below picture shows the impact of the largest Pakistani warhead if detonated in New Delhi. No doubt, Delhi has a high population density and this will bring high civilian deaths. But we need to consider three very important points that would decrease civilian deaths in case of a nuclear exchange:

1) Pakistan would try to hit strategic military locations

Pakistan cannot expect to stop the war just by nuking Indian cities. It will in fact bring massive nuclear retaliation from India and nuclear escalation. In this MAD scenario, Pakistan can only hope to achieve some stalemate by targeting strategic military locations. This is the reason that Pakistan came up with the fancy name of tactical battlefield weapons to directly target the advancing Indian Army. While this might help achieve some military objectives, it reduces the number of warheads that Pakistan can launch towards high-density Indian cities.

2) Not all nuclear launches will be a surprise

One of the other reasons that lead to high civilian casualty is the simple arithmetic used to extrapolate destruction. Since Tokyo was four times more densely populated than Hiroshima, it would have resulted in four times the number of deaths if the bomb was dropped there. But this does not take into account that people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were caught unaware, while in Tokyo — due to frequent bombing raids — people were well prepared and could hide. If nuclear weapons lose their surprise value, it gives enough time for civilians and local government to move people out of high-density areas or hide in underground tunnels. The ill-effects of nuclear radiation will still be around for some time, but after a period of 72 hours people can move around and perform their jobs in the destroyed area. A single nuke in a city does not cause the end of civilization — as one can see if they visit Hiroshima or Nagasaki today.

3) India will retaliate and stop many of these weapons

This is the third most important aspect — whether the enemy is able to launch all its bombs and land them in your country. India does not have a fully developed BMD shield, but that does not mean we cannot intercept incoming Pakistani missiles or fighter jets. Also, a massive retaliation from India can completely cripple Pakistan’s delivery capability. On top of that, Pakistan has not yet achieved complete nuclear triad and so they do not have any submarines lurking in the Indian Ocean to take down Indian cities once Pakistan is completely annihilated.

The term MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) was coined in reference to the rivalry between US and USSR when both had more than 5,000 nuclear warheads and perfect delivery vehicles. This is not the case in the Indo-Pak rivalry. Pakistan’s arsenal is estimated at around 120 warheads according to current estimates. So we won’t face MAD in an Indo-Pak war but the annihilation of Pakistan if it resorts to nuclear exchange. Even in the worst case scenario, only a few Pakistani nukes will be able to breach Indian defence.

Now, regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program specifically: Pakistan uses yellowcake centrifuge method which takes around 3–5 years for building a 30 kiloton warhead. Since it has negligible to insignificant fissile material reserves, a sustained nuclear exchange is unlikely in case of war. Pakistan’s nuclear program is almost totally dependent on China and others for fuel and accessories, which hampers its capability to build a huge arsenal.

Unlike India, Pakistan has a first-use policy when forced into a conventional war. Pakistan’s two main delivery systems are Tapedong scud-type missiles from North Korean cruise missiles and the Nasr. But Pakistan does not have proven miniaturization of nuclear warheads to allow it to mate warheads on small cruise missiles. Also, the short range of missiles like Nasr restricts their use apart from being used as tactical battlefield nukes.

Looking forward, two things are going to happen: Pakistan’s arsenal will grow with help from China, and its delivery mechanism will improve as it tries to achieve nuclear triad. Point one does not matter as long as they do not have delivery systems and India has well-functioning BMD and air-superiority fighters. To counter the second, we will have to invest more in developing state-of-the-art BMD. But the threat will not be completely eliminated as Pakistan develops a bigger arsenal and poses a bigger security risk.

Based on these factors, it is better to de-nuclearize Pakistan now rather than wait for an opportune moment in the future. India missed a perfect opportunity to escalate the war in Kargil and call out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff — as it would have exposed Pakistan’s low arsenal and deficient delivery mechanism and possibly killed the program in its infancy. With Chinese support to Pakistan growing each day, the bluff will turn into a real nightmare at some point in the future unless India adopts a course-correcting measure now: use the next terrorist attack as a pretext for overt war on Pakistan and use it to de-nuclearize it.