
Adverse effects of demonetization are finally trickling down into the economy. Although a lot can be said about the poor implementation part of the policy, this article will focus just on the economics. One very important point to keep in mind during this whole discussion is to not cloud the economics judgement of policy through moral lenses.
The developments in the last few weeks have confirmed YP predictions in the past:
1) It would lead to slowdown of economy: The service sector contracted in November which is the first time in last 18 months. The Nikkei Services Purchasing Managers’ Index fell to 46.7 in November from 54.5 in the previous month, the sharpest reduction in three years. You can also take car sales as another metric of economic performance. Here again, November saw an 8% decrease in car sales pointing towards decrease in demand.
2) Big fish have found ways to escape: IT raid at the residence of two government officials found 6 crores of unaccounted cash, out of which 4.7 crore was in new currency. So while the poor and middle class are lining up at banks and ATMs and are restricted to withdraw puny amounts, those with large stash of black money have found illegal ways to change their currency.
The worst part in this whole exercise is the chest thumping by free market economists on rise of temporary tax revenue for GoI. Tax money for the Govt is just tax money of the government. It does not indicate the actual GDP of the country or economic growth.
For example, if people of the country are earning/producing 150Tn ₹ in total output and government tax rate on it is 10%, the Govt tax revenue will be 15Tn ₹. Let’s say if the Govt raises the tax rate by 1% to 11%, and the economy “contracts” by 1%, then GDP of the economy will go down by 1.5Tn ₹ to 148.5 Tn ₹, while the tax income for the Govt will still increase by 1.15 Tn ₹ to 16.33 Tn ₹. So, tax income increase for the Govt doesn’t automatically equal to GDP increase/growth/income for the public/citizens.
The same can be said about the other assumptions used by the author. Most of the figures quoted everywhere for black money are just guess-estimates with government or economists having little clue about the numbers.
But the analysis is flawed even from the welfare perspective of the policy. The way regular economists would evaluate any policy is by comparing growth with the counter-factual scenario. Agricultural sector picking up due to better monsoon is not an effect of demonetization and would have been there irrespective of the policy implementation.
The gains also rest on future increase in tax net. People who pay taxes today are in no way liable to pay taxes in the future and a large number of them can drop out again. Hence the push for digitizing the economy to make it easy to track the transactions.
And it is really difficult to understand how increase in government tax revenue at the cost of decrease in overall GDP growth is hailed as success of the policy. Once accounting for the pain faced by regular citizens plus deceleration of GDP growth, some temporary increase in GoI revenues does not seem such a great policy.
As predicted by YP, thanks to the jugadu nature of Indians and help of government officials, people have converted their old notes to new notes. Effectively, the claims of removing 4-5 Tn ₹ of black money from the total stock of money would not materialize. So, GoI has failed on its primary goal in the short run. On top we are witnessing a contraction in the economy, which would linger on for the next few quarters. Once taking into account all these factors, it seems that the whole policy was big farcical show for nothing substantial.
