
PM Modi should be lauded for the efforts that he is putting in to make India an industrial hub and generate jobs for the rising young population. But the efforts beg a question — will Make in India work as a policy and achieve its desired objectives i.e. increase the share of manufacturing and generate jobs? Given the current regulatory environment, the answer seems no. Let’s explore why.
Before understanding whether Make in India will work, look at the historical composition of the Indian economy:
![[Chart: Structural change in Indian economy — shares of manufacturing, agriculture and services over time] Source: Rubina Verma, Journal of Development Economics, 2012](/YP_MEDIA:15-make-in-india-how-to-make-it-work-media-1.jpg)
India is an outlier when it comes to structural change of the economy. At India’s level of per capita GDP, most countries would have a higher share of manufacturing rather than services. India is different because it directly jumped from a high share of agriculture to the services sector, bypassing the growth in manufacturing that is seen as an intermediate step in most developing economies. Thus India missed out on pulling its masses from the agricultural sector. Although services contribute more than 50% to Indian GDP, the sector employs a much smaller proportion of the population. On the other hand, the manufacturing share has remained almost constant in terms of GDP, with only a slightly higher share in employment.
The Make in India initiative should be seen in this context — to correct the historical bias in India’s growth story and revive the manufacturing sector to generate jobs on a mass scale as happened in China. Indian regulations have been blamed for this lopsided non-growth in manufacturing. So, can Make in India style initiatives give a boost to Indian manufacturing? To understand this we need to look at the basics without getting carried away by Modi’s hard work and intent.
Although structural change can be caused by preference or income changes in the population, at India’s level of per capita GDP we can rule them out. So we have to look at the supply side and understand why manufacturing did not pick up in India and whether the current government has changed anything on the ground. For any sector to flourish, one needs to look at the input requirements. The inputs are basically three — capital, land and labour — which are often called factor markets.
1) Capital
Capital is needed for setting up any industry. Capital markets have been relatively free and open in India — there is a well-developed stock market as well as banking services to infuse capital into new firms. But what is the current situation on the ground? The banking sector which forms the core of this factor market has been brought to its knees due to unscrupulous lending to crony capitalists. The public sector banks are in dire need of massive capital infusion without which they cannot kick-start the lending cycle. The bad plus restructured loans form 17% of total assets of public sector banks.
This means that an otherwise healthy sector is not working well in the country. One can forget about firms investing in new projects given that banks are not in a position to take risk and lend money. Modi’s initiative to court foreign investors with deep pockets can ameliorate this problem to some extent but FDI and FII are not going to reignite investment in the whole economy.
2) Land
Land is another crucial factor, but unlike capital it is highly regulated in India. Given problems in land acquisition, serious businessmen who do not have deep pockets to bribe the establishment cannot set up any industry. This factor market impeded the growth of the manufacturing sector because it needs to acquire massive tracts of land unlike the services sector. The Land Acquisition Bill passed by the last UPA government delivered the final nail in the coffin — making acquiring land a gargantuan task, an almost impossible feat for any small investor.
Since the Modi government could not pass modifications to the current land bill in the last few Parliament sessions, the land market is completely strangulated at the current moment. Given policy uncertainty and huge costs involved in acquiring land, no serious player would put his money in manufacturing. Unlike with capital markets where Modi is courting foreign investors, the government does not seem to be doing enough to improve the land market. Probably the land acquisition model of Naidu in Andhra Pradesh can provide some hints to the Modi government on how to bypass this deadlock — but they are all quick fixes rather than long-term solutions.
3) Labour
Labour is the third main factor market and is again highly regulated. A massive number of regulations kick in once a firm crosses employment thresholds. This along with firing costs makes it almost impossible for any firm to shut down loss-making operations, thus putting a brake on the process of creative destruction — an important ingredient of a market economy.
![[Chart: Discontinuous decrease in number of enterprises at 10 employees threshold] Source: Amrit Amirapu and Michael Gechter, 2014](/YP_MEDIA:15-make-in-india-how-to-make-it-work-media-3.jpg)
Since many labour regulations kick in at 10 employees, the sharp decrease in the number of enterprises at that threshold is not a surprise. Another important drawback of these labour regulations is that they have forced the manufacturing sector to automate — making it highly capital intensive, which again means there will not be enough employment generation even if firms figure out how to invest and acquire land.
![[Chart: Ratio of value added by labour-intensive vs non-labour-intensive sectors in India] Source: Kochhar et al, 2006](/YP_MEDIA:15-make-in-india-how-to-make-it-work-media-5.jpg)
What clearly stands out is that at India’s level of per capita GDP, the share of labour-intensive sectors is too low — firms use more capital instead of labour. China at four times India’s per capita income uses the same labour mix as India. Given labour regulations in India, not only do firms invest in capital-intensive sectors, but they also try to replace labour with capital whenever possible.
Sadly, beyond the slogans, the Modi government has not passed any game-changing laws for labour deregulation either. Even if the Make in India initiative picks up, it is highly unlikely that new firms will invest in labour-intensive sectors — with the end result that there won’t be enough employment generation. Rajasthan under Vasundhara has shown some interest in changing these regulations, but the central government has shied away from pursuing these issues. Unless trade unions and other vested interests are taken head-on to bring these changes, it is highly unlikely that India can generate enough jobs for its youth.
Given these deep problems with factor markets, it will only be a miracle if Modi can deliver ten million new jobs every year through his Make in India initiative. The fundamentals are wrong and it will be plain stupidity to expect otherwise. While big conferences are a good PR exercise, they cannot replace serious policy changes. Everyone knows that BJP does not have a majority in Rajya Sabha, but “Reforms are the art of the possible” as stated by Arun Jaitley on multiple occasions. Hopefully, the Modi government will learn this art before it is too late.
References:
Amrit Amirapu and Michael Gechter, Indian Labor Regulations and the Cost of Corruption: Evidence from the Firm Size Distribution, 2014
Rubina Verma, Can Total Factor Productivity Explain Value Added Growth in Services? — Journal of Development Economics, 2012
Kochhar et al, India’s Patterns of Development: What Happened, What Follows, IMF, 2006

![[Chart: Structural change in Indian economy — shares of manufacturing, agriculture and services over time] Source: Rubina Verma, Journal of Development Economics, 2012](/YP_MEDIA:16-make-in-india-myth-vs-reality-media-1.jpg)
![[Chart: Discontinuous decrease in number of enterprises at 10 employees threshold] Source: Amrit Amirapu and Michael Gechter, 2014](/YP_MEDIA:16-make-in-india-myth-vs-reality-media-3.jpg)
![[Chart: Ratio of value added by labour-intensive vs non-labour-intensive sectors in India] Source: Kochhar et al, 2006](/YP_MEDIA:16-make-in-india-myth-vs-reality-media-5.jpg)