Tag: Rohillas

Today is the 255th anniversary of the third battle of Panipat, which was fought between the Afghans and the Marathas in 1761. There is a plethora of information available on the third battle of Panipat, down to the exact dispositions of the men and officers. This has been the most analysed battle in the ancient to medieval era in India. Thus this story can be recounted in exact detail.

The roots of the expedition lay in Afghan king Ahmad Shah Abdali’s repeated invasions of India. In 1757, he invaded again at the invitation of Najib Khan Rohilla, the leader of the Afghans who had settled in the Katehr region of UP. Because these Afghans had come from Roh in Afghanistan, Katehr’s name was changed to Rohilkhand — needless to say that the name has not yet been changed by the ‘secular’ governments that regularly trample upon the rights of Hindus.

The 1757 invasion of Abdali was a particularly brutal invasion. Not only was Delhi looted, but the Mughal princesses were forced into the bed of Abdali and his son. Mathura was sacked and the Yamuna was turned red for several miles with the bodies of dead people. Eventually the pile of dead corpses became infected and diseases broke out in Abdali’s army, which finally prompted him to retreat back to Afghanistan.

How it started

The Wazir of Delhi, Imad-ul-Mulk had kept a force of Marathas in his pay under Antaji Mankeshwar. They had been borrowed from the Peshwa. These gave a good account of themselves as they killed two thousand Afghan soldiers, but had to retreat as they were numbering only four thousand and were outnumbered.

The Indian Afghans under Najib Khan Rohilla now dominated not only Delhi, Haryana and the region between the Ganga and Yamuna, but also Rohilkhand. The Wazir Imad-ul-Mulk realised that only the Marathas could deliver Delhi from this menace and invited them to Delhi with a powerful force.

Marathas conquer Delhi and Punjab

The Peshwa sent his brother Raghunathrao (popularly called Raghoba) with a powerful force into North India. Raghoba immediately captured Delhi and Najib Khan became a prisoner in his hands. This was the right moment to kill Najib as he was one who was inviting Abdali and could invite again. Besides, he had the blood of innocent people of Mathura on his hands.

But Najib paid Malhar Rao Holkar, the Maratha ruler of Malwa, huge bribes to save his life. Malhar Rao prevailed upon Raghoba to spare Najib and thus Najib was set free! This was the greatest mistake of Raghoba as the treacherous Najib was to invite Abdali again.

Now Raghoba made a surprising decision and invaded Punjab, which was Abdali’s territory. His forces conquered Lahore and then advanced on to Attock on the Indus, which was considered by Hindus to be the boundary of India. Abdali’s son Taimur, the Afghan governor of Punjab, was defeated and fled. According to the historian Grant Duff:

The Deccan horse had slaked their thirst in the waters of the Indus!

— Grant Duff, History of Mahrattas

In the Maratha capital Pune, there was wild jubilation and the Peshwa talked about capturing Kabul and Kandahar, and ambassadors were sent by Iran on hearing this news. But this actually made Abdali the deadly enemy of Marathas, for Punjab was the breadbasket of his empire, which was otherwise made of arid regions like Afghanistan and Baluchistan.

Having captured Punjab, Raghoba however could not face the biting cold of Lahore as winter came and decamped back to the Deccan with the majority of his army, leaving only 15,000 troops behind. Sabaji Scindia was sent as governor, who went even further and captured Peshawar and garrisoned it with 10,000 men. But the total troops that remained in the province numbered only 32,000 — hardly enough to face Abdali in full force. The Marathas had created enemies in India without destroying them — like the Nizam of Hyderabad, Najib Khan, Hyder Ali of Mysore and others — so troops were needed to garrison other parts of the empire. In hindsight Raghoba’s expedition to capture Punjab must be called a mad expedition.

Abdali was ready for a policy of live and let live — his ambassadors made it clear that he was ready to accept Maratha domination over Delhi, Haryana and western UP, if they gave up Punjab. But the Maratha ambition was boundless and they rejected it. Marathas also made the mistake of not properly taking the help of the Sikhs, who were natural allies for them.

Abdali invades India again — Battle of Barari Ghat

Najib Khan Rohilla had already been making calls to Abdali that Islam in India was in danger. Abdali assembled a force of 60,000 storm troopers — one of the finest cavalry in all Asia, all battle-hardened troops and especially cruel, ferocious and merciless. With this force he advanced from Kandahar along the Indus to Peshawar. Looking at the size and ferocity of his force, the Maratha garrison had to flee.

As Abdali advanced to Sirhind, the news reached Dattaji Scindia, the Maratha Governor of Delhi. Dattaji had been besieging Najib at Shukartal but with Abdali invading India, he was now faced with a superior force of Afghans and Rohillas — more than 1 lakh men. He had about 50,000 men with him, clearly insufficient. The only choice was to retreat, but Dattaji was a proud man.

As Abdali and Najib linked up on the eastern side of the Yamuna, Dattaji prepared on the west bank to fight. It was at Barari Ghat that the battle took place. Dattaji was right in the forefront — a serious mistake, as ideally a general should be at the back to guide his troops. He was shot by Rohilla troops who had muskets, and killed. Immediately panic seized his army and they began to flee.

The Afghans found the body of Dattaji. Najib’s minister Qutub Shah cut his head and took it away as a trophy — and the Marathas had to cremate his headless body. Later the Marathas would take revenge on Qutub Shah for this perfidy.

Maratha expedition to Panipat

The news of Dattaji’s death fell like a thunderbolt on the Marathas when it reached Pune. Great preparations were made for war. The Peshwa’s cousin Sadashivraobhau was selected as commander, for he had recently won a splendid victory over the Nizam at Udgir. He was a great believer in the European style of warfare using long-range muskets handled by well-drilled infantry troops.

The core of the army was 9,000 Gardis with 200 heavy cannon. But this style of warfare went completely against the Maratha style of mobile warfare on horses. The Peshwa added to this army a vast retinue of servants, dancing girls, wives of soldiers and camp-followers totalling more than 200,000 people — totally changing the Maratha style of making war with only light cavalry. This was to have disastrous results.

The fighting men totalled 85,000. Scindias of Gwalior, Holkars of Indore and Gaikwads of Baroda all added lustre to the galaxy of generals. Considering the vast numbers, the army moved slowly and by the time it reached across the Chambal river, the rainy season was at hand.

Arrogance of the Bhau — the friendless Marathas in north India

Once the Marathas had crossed the Chambal, Bhau sent ambassadors to all princes in north India to join him. Only the Jat Raja of Bharatpur joined him temporarily. The ruler of Awadh, Nawab Shuja-ud-Daula joined Abdali. So did the Pathans of Farrukabad. No Hindu was willing to join the Marathas.

The reason was not far to seek. Everyone knew that if the Marathas won at Panipat, they would become the rulers of India — meaning the destruction of everyone, Muslim or Hindu. On the other hand, if Abdali won, not only would they be free of the Maratha menace but Abdali himself would go back. The Afghans did not have the staying power of the Marathas and were not about to create an empire in India. So everyone would survive in the event of an Afghan win. The Maratha behaviour of looting even Hindus had not endeared them to the Hindus.

At Delhi, a war council was held in which both Malhar Rao Holkar and Jat Raja Suraj Mal gave sound advice to Bhau. They asked that the heavy baggage, women and camp-followers should be sent southwards, as it would prove a major impediment. In the event of defeat they could run away on light horses and escape to fight another day.

But Bhau rejected this advice! He insulted Malhar Rao by calling him a shepherd and insulted Jat Raja Suraj Mal by calling him a mere Zamindar. Thus Bhau resolved to take the women and camp followers into the zone of battle. Suraj Mal was so incensed that he abandoned the Marathas and went back to his domains. Malhar Rao secretly began talks with Najib Khan to save his own skin — and Najib agreed not to fight Malhar if he also did not attack Najib.

Afghans deliver the masterstroke of the war

From Delhi, Bhau moved northwards. He captured Kunjpura — a base of Abdali’s communications with Afghanistan — by bombardment, putting the entire Afghan garrison to death and finding Qutub Shah, who had cut off Dattaji’s head, and torturing him to death.

Abdali was stunned by the capture of Kunjpura but could not cross the flooded Yamuna. The Marathas enjoyed the huge foodstuffs found there and celebrated Dussehra — forgetting their main task and wasting time in praying.

Bhau made a serious mistake in not keeping strong patrols on the Yamuna. After desperate searching, a shallow crossing was found and the Afghan army crossed. They lost some 500 men to drowning but were finally across. This was truly the masterstroke of the war — Abdali was now south of the Marathas and in a position to cut off their way to the south. The Marathas were now trapped. Their supply line was cut. The Afghans were supplied food and provisions by Najib and allies. On the other hand the Marathas began to starve.

As they moved south, they found their way blocked by the Afghan hordes south of a super-unlucky place which had already seen the defeat of Indian armies twice before. This was Panipat — and this was going to be the third battle fought there.

The rival armies at Panipat

The two armies encamped at Panipat. The Marathas built ditches around their camp and ramparts with cannon at regular intervals. The first few weeks were dominated by the Marathas — their artillery kept firing cannon shells which fell onto the Afghans. Abdali had to move his camp farther south and out of range. The Marathas launched raids onto the Afghan camp.

In the dead of night, 5,000 Rohillas slipped through a weak point into the Maratha camp and started slaughtering them. The Gardi musketeers opened fire and killed more than 3,000 Rohillas — the rest fled. But Bhau’s personal friend Balwant Rao Mehendale was killed, filling Bhau with gloom.

From this point the Afghans dominated the plains between the two armies. All supplies to the Marathas were stopped and starvation began. A large force carrying treasure for the Bhau accidentally went into the Afghan camp in the dark and was annihilated. The vast retinue of servants, women and camp-followers quickly finished the remaining food at Panipat. Animals began to die for want of forage.

At last all men felt so weak that they gathered around Bhau’s tent clamouring for a fight to save their honour. Bhau agreed. Next morning the Marathas marched out with their faces pasted with saffron, as defenders of Hinduism. The date was 14 January 1761.

The battle of Panipat — phases I, II and III

The Marathas opened the action by firing their cannons, but the rapid movement of the Afghans meant that by the time the cannon were elevated and fired, the Afghans were ahead of the position on which they were aimed. The cannonballs fell harmlessly behind the Afghan troops. The cannons, which had proven decisive against static targets at Delhi and Kunjpura, proved useless on the fluid battlefield.

Bhau’s Gardi musketeers on his left then opened fire on the Rohillas and Afghans in front of them. The Gardis worked with clock-like precision — one line fired while the next reloaded. The Afghans on the right began to be decimated; between 8,000 to 9,000 of them lost their lives. The Afghan right seemed to be collapsing. Ibrahim Khan Gardi, their brilliant commander — a Pathan who had earlier rejected Afghan bribes and appeals to common religion, saying “my loyalty lies to the land which I have made my home, not from which I come” — led them magnificently.

However, jealousy grew among the cavalry of Damaji Gaikwad and Vitthal Shivdev posted to the Gardis’ right. They saw the battle being won by the Gardis while traditional Maratha cavalry did nothing. So they charged the Afghan lines before the Afghans had been fully decimated — bringing them within range of the short-range Afghan muskets. The entire charging force was cut to pieces at point-blank range. And since the horse-borne Marathas were now between the Afghans and the Gardis, the Gardis had to stop firing so as not to hit their own comrades.

Meanwhile, in the center the famed Huzrat cavalry scattered the Afghans and charged them, scattering thousands. For the Marathas, this was their golden opportunity. The Afghan right was turned and the center had melted. Considerable gaps had opened in the Afghan lines through which they could safely pass to the south, to safety and food!

But how could they! If they escaped to the south, they would have to leave behind the multitude of women, old and infirm people and servants — those who depended on them for safety. Could a Maratha soldier show his face in Maharashtra if he came back leaving these people to the tender mercies of the rapist Afghans? No. The Marathas after this charge had to return back to their original positions.

Abdali immediately sent his reserves and military police — numbering 10,000 — behind the fleeing Afghans with orders to browbeat them back. The situation was explained to them: they were in a far-off country and if defeated had nowhere to run. Finally they were brought back and re-divided into two groups, one to the centre and one to the right.

The Afghan troops back in position saw that the Gardi troops were now alone without cavalry escort — their protectors having been slaughtered by their own foolish assault. The Gardis were charged in full force. They fought as best as they could but were slaughtered to every single man. Ibrahim Khan Gardi himself was captured. But they and their gallant commander had honoured themselves on the battlefield by taking on a numerically superior force and nearly decimating it.

On the Maratha right, Malhar Rao Holkar had deliberately taken position opposite Najib Khan Rohilla — his secret friend. At a pre-arranged signal, Malhar Rao left his position and escaped from the battlefield. Najib did not attack him. This suddenly exposed the flank of the Scindia troops to his immediate left, who were attacked from the side and cut to pieces. Jankoji Scindia had to run to safety. The Maratha right wing was turned toward the center.

Abdali ordered his Zamburaks — swivel-cannons fitted on camels, more mobile than the static Maratha cannons — to attack. Then he ordered his Iranian troops with distinctive red headgear to attack the Maratha flank. A titanic battle developed. Both sides fought with swords, spears, battle axes and even daggers for more than two hours.

The Peshwa’s son Vishwasrao, the 17-year-old nominal commander, fought like a true warrior by the side of his uncle. When he mounted an elephant to bolster his forces, he was shot dead by an Afghan musket — exactly as Dattaji Scindia had been killed.

At this point, Bhau lost his head and forgot his duty as a general. He knew he could not show his face in Pune to Vishwasrao’s mother. He ordered his bodyguards, numbering hundreds, to accompany him as he plunged into the Afghan lines. Word spread among the Marathas that he had died. Many began to flee. The Afghans hounded them mercilessly. As they fled into the town of Panipat, they were chased and savagely massacred.

Some 75,000 of the 85,000 fighting men lost their lives — in all 2 lakh Marathas lost their lives. In Maharashtra not a single home was left which did not have to mourn the loss of a member. It was verily the doomsday of the Maratha people.

The news reached Shrimant Peshwa Nanasaheb, son of Bajirao, when he was at Sironj. An enigmatic letter came saying:

Needless to say, the gold were the sardars and the pearls were Bhau and Vishwasrao. Shocked by the news, the Peshwa breathed his last.

Abdali was not able to hold on to Punjab for which he had fought such an epic battle. The Sikhs took advantage of his weakened condition due to the losses at Panipat and wrested it from him in the coming years. But in Bengal, the race of white men were raising a Union Jack and were smiling at their good fortune.